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ABSTRACT
A NEW APPROACH TO AGE AND RISK TAKING
BEHAVIOR OF AGENTS
KOZAN, Zeynep
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Emin Karagözo¼glu
September 2012
In this thesis, we use evolutionary game theory techniques to analyze the rela-
tion between risk taking behavior of agents and their ages. We suppose that
risk aversion is the stable pattern for the old agents and risk seeking is the
stable pattern for the young agents as it is commonly assumed so in economics
literature. First, we solve a benchmark model without heterogeneity in terms of
age di¤erentiations. In such a case, we observe that mutation either increases or
decreases with respect to the payo¤ levels, depending on the initial tness levels
of the population groups. In the second step, we introduce heterogeneous pop-
ulation frontier. The anticipated level of the initial mutant proportion provides
incentives to triger the evolution. Then, we analyze numerically the e¤ects of
the initial level of tness, initial risk averse and risk seeking proportions on the
pattern of the evolution process. Finally, we studied the intertemporal e¤ects
of di¤erent risk averse and risk seeking population proportions on mutation.
Keywords: Risk Aversion, Risk Seeking, Risk Dominant Equilibrium, Evolu-
tionary Game Theory, Age and Risk, Coordination Games
iii
ÖZET
YAS¸ VE B·IREYLER·IN R·ISK ALMA
DAVRANIS¸LARINA YEN·I B·IR YAKLAS¸IM
KOZAN, Zeynep
Yüksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Assist. Prof. Dr. Emin Karagözo¼glu
Eylül 2012
Bu tezde, bireylerin risk alma davran¬¸slar¬ile yas¸lar¬aras¬ndaki ili¸skiyi analiz et-
mek için evrimsel oyun teorisi tekniklerini kullan¬yoruz. Ekonomi literatüründe
kabul edildi¼gi üzere riskten kaç¬nman¬n yas¸l¬lar için, risk aray¬¸s¬n¬n ise gençler için
dura¼gan davran¬¸s biçimi oldu¼gunu varsay¬yoruz. Öncelikle, yas¸ farkl¬las¸mas¬kap-
sam¬nda heterojenlik içermeyen temel bir model çözüyoruz. Böyle bir durumda,
popülasyon gruplar¬n¬n bas¸lang¬ç uyum seviyeleri durumuna ba¼gl¬olarak mutasy-
onun kazanç seviyelerine göre artt¬¼g¬n¬ya da azald¬¼g¬n¬gözlemliyoruz. ·Ikinci as¸a-
mada, modele popülasyon heterojenli¼gi ekliyoruz. Böyle bir modelde, öngörülen
bas¸lang¬ç mutant oranlar¬, evrimin tetiklenmesini sa¼gl¬yor. Daha sonra, bas¸lang¬ç
uyum seviyesinin, bas¸lang¬ç riskten kaç¬nma ve bas¸lang¬ç risk aray¬¸s¬oranlar¬n¬n,
evrim sürecine etkilerini nümerik olarak inceliyoruz. Son olarak, popülasyondaki
farkl¬ riskten kaç¬nma ve risk aray¬¸s¬ oranlar¬n¬n mutasyon üzerindeki zaman-
lararas¬etkilerini aras¸t¬r¬yoruz.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Risten Kaç¬nma, Risk Aray¬¸s¬, Risk Bask¬n Denge, Evrimsel
Oyun Teorisi, Yas¸ ve Risk, Kordinasyon Oyunlar¬
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
There are numerous studies in economics literature which studied the e¤ect of age
on risk-taking. These studies show that, the well-known conclusion, risk taking de-
creases with age (Morin and Suarez, 1983; Holmstrom and Milagrom, 1987; Kanodia
et al., 1989; Riley and Chow, 1992). Using di¤erent measures such as observed port-
folio allocations of wealth (Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 2006) or large scale survey
studies analyzing the whole population (Barsky et al., 1997; Donkers et al., 2001;
Dohmen et al., 2006), these studies show that willingness to take risk is decreasing
with age. Using the lowa Gambling Task, a task to measure ambiguity, various stud-
ies also nd a negative correlation between risk taking and age (Fein et al., 2007;
Denburg et al., 2005; Zamarin et al., 2008). Further studies found that violations of
expected utility theory are decreasing with age (Kume and Suzuki, 2010; Harbaugh
et al., 2002).
On the other hand there are various studies in psychology literature which show
that older adults may be more risk seeking than younger adults. Considering the
framing e¤ects on young and old agents they conclude that old agents are more likely
to be risk averse (i.e., to move away from a risky option) when questions are framed
as gains (i.e., positively) and more risk seeking (i.e., to move toward a risky option)
when questions are framed as losses (i.e., negatively), (Hasher et al., 2005; Lauriola
and Levin, 2001). By considering such a psychological result, our motivation is that
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under negative conditions such as the last nancial crises the world experienced,
could the old agents evaluate these conditions as a negative frame? For instance,
also Weber at al. (2004) did a meta analysis of studies involving decision outcomes
described to study participants and found that increasing age (age ranges were not
specied in their paper) was associated with greater risk seeking (more choices of
a gamble over a sure thing) in losses; they did not, however, nd a link between
increasing age and risk aversion (more choices of a sure thing over a gamble) in
gains. Another study which was presented by Arkes and Ayton (1999), displays
an empirical evidence from studies on sunk-cost e¤ects. There is an interesting
di¤erence in test results between adults and children with regard to the sunk-cost
e¤ect. Children under 10 years of age seem to be less susceptible to the sunk-
cost e¤ect than humans of older ages. Arkes and Ayton explain this by the fact
that young humans have more modest cognitive abilities. These cognitive abilities
are suggested to be the main explanation for sunk-cost e¤ects, because humans,
especially adults, tend to dene complex strategies (Janssen and Sche¤er, 2004).
A contrary to the well-known results (i.e., risk aversion increases with age) in
economics is Wang and Hannas (1997) research which is consistent with the results
in psychology literature we mentioned above. Using the 1983-1989 panel of the
survey of consumer nances they nd out that relative risk aversion decreases as
people age (i.e., the proportion of net wealth invested in risky assets increases as
people age). They show that risk tolerance increases with age which is contrary to
constant life-cycle risk aversion hypothesis. Their conclusion is young people may
appear more risk averse since it is hard for them to endure any short-term investment
losses with limited nancial resources. Future human wealth cannot be applied to
pay present bills, car loans, mortgage debts, etc. Besides, William B. Riley Jr. and
K. Victor Chow (1992), who studied asset allocation and individual risk aversion in
their research, showed that risk aversion decreases with age- but only up to a point.
After age 65 (retirement), risk aversion increases with age.
In this thesis, the psychological concept on risk taking behavior with respect
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to age is extended by using insight from research on human decision making. Al-
though the common belief in economics lays out that the old humans are more
risk averse, while the young ones are more risk seeking, whythere does not exist
coherence with the studies in psychology literature. There is no any research in
the literature which tries to present an explanation to this mismatching we observe
in these two di¤erent disciplines. This is the main motivation for this research to
be able to introduce a link between both disciplines and discard this dualism by
a theoretical model. One of the questions we address is why humans of older
ages may invest on risky options while the humans of young ages are not subject
to invest on them. In our view, an important factor that might explain these is
the sunk-cost e¤ect where human decision making is typically inuenced by the
level of prior investments. Janssen and Sche¤er (2004:6) claim that "According to
conventional economic theory, only the incremental costs and benets of the current
options should be included in decision making. However, numerous examples show
that humans do take into account prior investment when they consider what course
of action to follow." Hence, the learning procedure of agents will be an important
input in our work to study the analysis of repositioning of them according to their
risk attitudes under evolutionary dynamics.
We will form a model as an evolutionary game which examines the feasible
strategies that is known in the literature (old people are more risk-averse than
young ones) versus the deviation from these strategies (old can choose to act in
a more risk seeking manner). At this point, we will consider the risk aversion as
the stable pattern of behavior among the older agents and risk seeking is stable
among the younger ones in a population, since the common belief is so in economics
literature. In other words, the literature supposes that the agents are programmed
to play particular strategies. Such an assumption supports that a stable pattern of
behavior in a population should be able to eliminate any invasion by a mutant, and
to do so it must have a higher tness than the mutant in the population that results
from the invasion. Here, the payo¤ of an agent by playing a particular strategy
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is interpreted as tness. By introducing two equilibrium into the model which
are constituted by payo¤ dominant and risk dominant strategies set, the deviations
between these strategies are possible to be examined.
Finally, we will use replicator dynamicsas the evolutionary dynamic, which
are rst called by Taylor and Jonker (1978) and Zeeman (1979), to investigate the
dynamic properties of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). This dynamic species
that the proportional rate of growth in a strategys representation in the population,
p, is given by the extent to which that strategy does better than the population
average.
The main perspective of this work is taking agents as heterogeneous among their
life-cycles. For this issue we will work on their decision taking processes by investi-
gating the results of such a heterogeneity. By using evolutionary game framework,
one of the main purposes of the model is to nd the proportions of risk aversion and
risk seeking among di¤erent populations at which level they work as a threshold for
evolution. There exists limited number of studies focused on what population aging
would mean for economic decisions that are sensitive to risk taking characteristics
of a population. Then, the solidity of the models used in economics, which have
left such a possible behavioral diversication among agents out of account, should
be questioned. In this thesis, we question in spite of the fact that there exist some
researches about the risk taking behavior of agents and how it changes among them
with respect to their ages, why such a new approach is not used in existing models.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Chapter 2, the benchmark model
will be introduced and solved by using evolutionary game which is constituted by
both a risk dominant equilibrium and a payo¤ dominant equilibrium. Since the
games we introduced for youngs and olds are symmetric games, we will present the
results for youngs without loss of generality. In Chapter 3, numerical analysis and
comparative statics for the parameters of the game will take place. Finally, Chapter
4 concludes the paper.
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CHAPTER 2
THE BENCHMARK MODEL
2.1 The Evolutionary Game
In this section we construct an explicit model of the process by which the frequency
of strategies changes in the population and study properties of the evolutionary
dynamics within the model. Thus, once the model of the population dynamics has
been specied, all of the standard stability concepts used in the analysis of dynamical
system can be brought to bear.
In this research, each game is played between (and among) the young and older
agents. Recalling the Riley and Chows framework, older agents will be taken as
the ones under the age of 65, and the ones above are excepted as retired. We will
examine each game, which are played by only youngs, played by only olds, and
nally played between youngs and olds, in detail section by section.
The basic model is of a repeated game played in periods t = 1; 2; 3; :::.The
population is large enough. In each period, individuals choose one of two possible
actions, Risk Aversion and Risk Seekingwhich are denoted by RA and RS.
That is ait 2 fRA;RSg. Formally, it is required that A > B and D > C so that
(RS;RS) and (RA;RA) are both Nash equilibria. In addition, we assume that
(D C)  (A B) for the younger agents so that (RA;RA) is the "risk dominant"
equilibrium. Since the economics literature claims that risk seeking is more common
among the young agents, it is consistent with Harsanyi and Selten (1988) taking the
5
strategy set (RS;RS) as payo¤ dominant for the young individuals. Note that
when the strategies have equal security levels (B = C), (RA;RA) is also the Pareto
optimum. Similarly, (RS;RS) will be the "risk dominant" equilibrium for the game
which is played by old agents. Hence, we will assume that A > B and D > C for
that game. In addition, we will assume that (A   B) > (D   C) for the olds, and
when (B = C), (RS;RS) will also be Pareto optimum of that game.
Table 1. General payo¤ tables of the model
Younger Agent
RS RA
Younger RS A; a C;b
Agent RA B; c D; d
Older Agent
RS RA
Older RS A; a C;b
Agent RA B; c D; d
Older Agent
RS RA
Younger RS A; a C;b
Agent RA B; c D; d
How a population in which these plays are repeatedly played will evolve in terms
of its risk taking characteristics is the main question. First, assume that the pop-
ulation is quite large. In this case, we can represent the state of the population by
simply keeping track of what proportion follows the strategies RA and RS. Let pra
and prs (without loss of generality, qra and qrs for the old population) denote these
proportions. Furthermore, let the average tness of risk aversion and risk seeking
be denoted by WRA and WRS, respectively, and let W be the average tness of the
entire population. The values of WRA, WRS, and W can be expressed in terms of
the population proportions and payo¤ values as follows:
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WRA = F0 + praF (RA;RA) + prsF (RA;RS); (1)
WRS = F0 + praF (RS;RA) + prsF (RS;RS); (2)
W = praWRA + prsWRS: (3)
Second, let us assume that the proportion of the population following the strate-
gies RA and RS in the next generation is related to the proportion of the population
following the strategies RA and RS in the current generation according to the rule:
p
0
ra =
praWRA
W
; (4)
p
0
rs =
prsWRS
W
: (5)
We can rewrite these expressions in the following form:
p
0
ra   pra =
pra(WRA  W )
W
; (6)
p
0
rs   prs =
prs(WRS  W )
W
: (7)
If we assume that the change in the strategy frequency from one generation to
the next are small, then the replicator dynamics:
dpra
dt
=
pra(WRA  W )
W
; (8)
dprs
dt
=
prs(WRS  W )
W
: (9)
The replicator dynamics may be used to model a population of individuals play-
ing the game we introduced above. For this game, the expected tness of Risk
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aversionand Risk seekingare expressed as follows:
WRA = F0 + praF (RA;RA) + prsF (RA;RS) (10)
= F0 + praD + prsB (11)
and
WRS = F0 + praF (RS;RA) + prsF (RS;RS) (12)
= F0 + praC + prsA (13)
By looking at the values of utility levels, we will analyze whether the following
indicators are positive or not:
WRS  W
W
(14)
and
WRA  W
W
: (15)
If an action ai taken by some individuals does better than average, its represen-
tation in the population grows (dpai=dt > 0), and if another strategy is even better,
then its growth rate is also higher than that of strategy ai.
2.1.1 The Young Agents
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The payo¤ matrix of the game which is played between young agents can be taken
as follows:
Table 2. Two player game between young agents
Younger Agent
RS RA
Younger RS A; a C;b
Agent RA B; c D; d
where the equilibrium (RS;RS) is Pareto dominant and the equilibrium (RA;RA)
is risk dominant. Then,
WRA = F0 + praD + prsB; (16)
WRS = F0 + praC + prsA; (17)
W = praWRA + prsWRS: (18)
Hence,
WRA  W
W
=
F0 + praD + prsB   pra(F0 + praD + prsB)  prs(F0 + praC + prsA)
praWRA + prsWRS
=
F0 + praD + prsB   praF0   p2raD   praprsB   prsF0   prspraC   p2rsA
praWRA + prsWRS
=
(1  pra   prs)F0 + (pra   p2ra)D + (prs   praprs)B   prspraC   p2rsA
praF0 + p2raD + praprsB + prsF0 + prspraC + p
2
rsA
=
(pra   p2ra)D + prs   praprs)B   prspraC   p2rsA
F0 + p2raD + praprsB + prspraC + p
2
rsA
=
pra(1  pra)D + prs(1  pra)B   prspraC   p2rsA
F0 + p2raD + praprsB + prspraC + p
2
rsA
=
(praD + prsB)(1  pra)  prs(praC + prsA)
F0 + p2raD + praprsB + prspraC + p
2
rsA
=
prs [praD + prsB   praC   prsA]
F0 + p2raD + praprsB + prspraC + p
2
rsA
=
prs [pra(D   C) + prs(B   A)]
F0 + p2raD + praprsB + prspraC + p
2
rsA
:
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Therefore, since prs > 0; pra > 0; and D > C; if pra(D   C) > prs(A B); then
WRA W
W
> 0: Thus, the representation of the action RA in the young population
grows. That is, if the following condition for the proportion of mutants in the young
population is satised, then we expect a rise in the representation of the mutant
strategy among the young agents:
pra
prs
>
A B
D   C =)
pra
1  pra >
A B
D   C
=) praD   praC > A B   praA+ praB
=) pra(D   C + A B) > A B
=) pra > A B
(A B) + (D   C) :
This result is consistent with Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Ellison
(1993) who studied the dynamics of a model constituted by a 2x2 coordination
game with uniform matching.
2.1.2 The Old Agents
The payo¤ matrix of the game which is played between young agents can be taken
as follows:
Table 3. Two player game between old agents
Older Agent
RS RA
Older RS A; a C;b
Agent RA B; c D; d
where the equilibrium (RA;RA) is Pareto dominant and the equilibrium (RS;RS)
is risk dominant. Then,
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WRA = F0 + qraD + qrsB; (19)
WRS = F0 + qraC + qrsA; (20)
W = qraWRA + qrsWRS: (21)
Therefore, since qrs > 0; qra > 0; and A > B; if qrs(A   B) > qra(D   C); then
WRS W
W
> 0: Thus, the representation of the action RS in the old population grows.
That is, whenever the following condition as of the mutantsproportion in the old
population is satised, we expect a rise in the representation of the mutant strategy
among the old agents:
qrs
qra
>
D   C
A B =)
qrs
1  qrs >
D   C
A B
=) qrsA  qrsB > D   C   qrsD + qrsC
=) qrs(A B +D   C) > D   C
=) qrs > D   C
(D   C) + (A B) :
2.1.3 Heterogeneity
In a large population it is reasonable to assume that population is constituted by
di¤erent kinds of agents belonging to various age groups. Here we suggest that this
di¤erence among the agents creates a kind of heterogeneity in the population. Hence,
it is necessary probing into a case of matching process of players as of di¤erent age
groups.
The payo¤ matrix of the game which is played between young agents and old
agents can be taken as follows:
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Table 4. Two player game between young and old agents
Older Agent
RS RA
Younger RS A; a C;b
Agent RA B; c D; d
Assume that the population size is N: Let the number of the youngs as of this
population be n, hence the number of olds will be N   n: Thus, (pRAyoung)n gives
the share of the risk averse youngs and (pRSyoung)n gives the share of the risk seeking
youngs in the population. Similarly, pRAold(N  n) gives the share of the risk averse
olds and pRSold(N   n) gives the share of the risk seeking olds in the population.
The probability of matching of a young with an old can be taken as N n
N 1 = :
Then, the probability of matching of a young with another young agent will be
n 1
N 1 = 1  :
Therefore, the average tness for the young population can be written as follows:
WRA =

F0 + (pRAyoungD + pRSyoungB)

(1  ) + [F0 + (pRAoldD + pRSoldB)]:
WRS =

F0 + (pRAyoungC + pRSyoungA)

(1  ) + [F0 + (pRAoldC + pRSoldA)]:
Let pRAyoung = pra and pRSyoung = prs for a simplier notation. Similarly, let
pRAold = qra and pRSold = qrs: Then the average tness of the whole population is
obtained as follows:
W = praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS:
Therefore,
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WRA  W
W
=
(F0 + praD + prsB)(1  ) + (F0 + qraD + qrsB)
praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS
 praqra [(F0 + praD + prsB)(1  ) + (F0 + qraD + qrsB)]
praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS
 prsqrs [(F0 + praC + prsA)(1  ) + (F0 + qraC + qrsA)]
praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS
:
WRA  W
W
=
(1  )F0 + F0   (1  )praqraF0   (1  )prsqrsF0
praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS
  praqraF0 + prsqrsF0
praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS
+
(1  )(praD + prsB)  (1  )praqra(praD + prsB)
praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS
+
(qraD + qrsB)  praqra(qraD + qrsB)
praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS
 (1  )prsqrs(praC + prsA)  prsqrs(qraC + qrsA)
praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS
:
Finally we have
WRA  W
W
=
[pra(1  qra) + qra(1  pra)]F0
praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS
+
(1  pra)(1  qra)[(   1)(1  pra)  (1  qra)]
praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS
A
+
[(1  )(1  pra) + (1  qra)] (1  praqra)
praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS
B
+
(1  pra)(1  qra) [(   1)pra   qra]
praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS
C
+
[(1  )pra + qra] (1  praqra)
praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS
D:
Since praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS > 0; it is su¢ cient to investigate whether the
condition below is satised or not:
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WRA  W = [pra(1  qra) + qra(1  pra)]F0
+(1  pra)(1  qra)[(   1)(1  pra)  (1  qra)]A
+(1  praqra) [(1  )(1  pra) + (1  qra)]B
+(1  pra)(1  qra) [(   1)pra   qra]C
+(1  praqra) [(1  )pra + qra]D
> 0:
The equality above also enable us to examine the necessary conditions for related
payo¤s to observe an increase in mutation behavior in a population.1 That is to
say that for a given population, by determining the proper payo¤ levels which are
presented to the agents, a population can be directed to a particular behavior. Con-
sequently, when the inequalities below hold, this guarantees that the risk dominant
strategy, RA; will dominate the young population:
A >
pra(qra   1) + qra(pra   1)
(pra   1)(qra   1)(pra   pra + qra   1)F0
 (praqra   1)(pra   1)  (pra   qra)(praqra   1)
(pra   1)(qra   1)(pra   pra + qra   1) B
  (pra   1)(qra   1)(pra   pra + qra)
(pra   1)(qra   1)(pra   pra + qra   1)C
  pra + (pra   qra)(praqra   1)
(pra   1)(qra   1)(pra   pra + qra   1)D
1The mathematical computing program cannot enable us to solve for the payo¤ level D explic-
itly.
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B >
pra(qra   1) + qra(pra   1)
(praqra   1)(pra   1)  (pra   qra)(praqra   1)F0
  (pra   1)(qra   1)(pra   pra + qra   1)
(praqra   1)(pra   1)  (pra   qra)(praqra   1)A
  (pra   1)(qra   1)(pra   pra + qra)
(praqra   1)(pra   1)  (pra   qra)(praqra   1)C
  pra + (pra   qra)(praqra   1)
(praqra   1)(pra   1)  (pra   qra)(praqra   1)D
C >   pra(qra   1) + qra(pra   1)
(pra   1)(qra   1)(pra   pra + qra)F0
+
(pra   1)(qra   1)(pra   pra + qra   1)
(pra   1)(qra   1)(pra   pra + qra) A
+
(praqra   1)(pra   1)  (pra   qra)(praqra   1)
(pra   1)(qra   1)(pra   pra + qra) B
+
pra + (pra   qra)(praqra   1)
(pra   1)(qra   1)(pra   pra + qra)D
Similarly, for a given population and given game, under particular payo¤ levels
if the condition below holds for the initial tness of the young population, it is
guaranteed that an increase in mutation among the young agents will be observed:
F0 >
(pra   1)(qra   1)(pra   pra + qra   1)
pra(qra   1) + qra(pra   1) A
+
(praqra   1)(pra   1)  (pra   qra)(praqra   1)
pra(qra   1) + qra(pra   1) B
 (pra   1)(qra   1)(pra   pra + qra)
pra(qra   1) + qra(pra   1) C
+
pra + (pra   qra)(praqra   1)
pra(qra   1) + qra(pra   1) D
Similarly, the probability of matching of an old with a young can be taken as
n
N 1 = 1   + , where  = 1N 1 : Then, the probability of matching of an old with
another old agent will be N n 1
N 1 =   : By following the same steps above for the
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old agents, the average tness for the old population can be written as follows:
WRA =

F0 + (pRAyoungD + pRSyoungB)

(1   + ) + [F0 + (pRAoldD + pRSoldB)] (   )
WRS =

F0 + (pRAyoungC + pRSyoungA)

(1   + ) + [F0 + (pRAoldC + pRSoldA)] (   )
and
W = praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS:
Therefore,
WRS  W
W
=
(F0 + praC + prsA)(1   + ) + (F0 + qraC + qrsA)(   )
praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS
 praqra [(F0 + praD + prsB)(1   + ) + (F0 + qraD + qrsB)(   )]
praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS
 prsqrs [(F0 + praC + prsA)(1   + ) + (F0 + qraC + qrsA)(   )]
praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS
:
WRS  W
W
=
(1   + )F0   (1   + )praqraF0   (1   + )prsqrsF0
praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS
+
(   )F0   (   )praqraF0   (   )prsqrsF0
praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS
+
(1   + )(praC + prsA)  (1   + )prsqrs(praC + prsA)
praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS
+
(   )(qraC + qrsA)  (   )prsqrs(qraC + qrsA)
praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS
 (1   + )praqra(praD + prsB) + (   )praqra(qraD + qrsB)
praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS
:
Finally we have
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WRS  W
W
=
[(1  prs)qrs + (1  qrs)prs]F0
praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS
+
[(1   + )prs + (   )qrs] (1  prsqrs)
praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS
A
+
(1  prs)(1  qrs) [(   1  )prs   (   )qrs]
praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS
B
+
[(1   + )(1  prs) + (   )(1  qrs)] (1  prsqrs)
praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS
C
+
(1  prs)(1  qrs)[(   1  )(1  prs)  (   )(1  qrs)]
praqraWRA + prsqrsWRS
D:
Hence, if the condition below holds, then the mutant strategy risk seeking, RS;
will dominate the old population:
WRS  W = [(1  prs)qrs + (1  qrs)prs]F0
+(1  prsqrs) [(1   + )prs + (   )qrs]A
+(1  prs)(1  qrs) [(   1  )prs   (   )qrs]B
+(1  prsqrs) [(1   + )(1  prs) + (   )(1  qrs)]C
+(1  prs)(1  qrs)[(   1  )(1  prs)  (   )(1  qrs)]D
> 0:
Case 2.1.3.1.1: pra = qra = 1;
WRA  W = 0:
Conclusion 1 If there exist only risk averse olds and risk averse youngs in a pop-
ulation, then any representation of the mutant strategy among the youngs will not
be observed.
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Case 2.1.3.1.2: pra 2 [0; 1] and qra = 1;
WRA  W = (1  pra)F0 + (1  )(1  pra)2B + [(1  )pra + ] (1  pra)D > 0:
Conclusion 2 If there exist only risk averse old agents in a population, then the
representation of the action RA in the young population grows. That is to say that
the representation of the mutant strategy among the youngs arises.
Case 2.1.3.1.3: pra 2 [0; 1] and qra = 0;
WRA  W = praF0 + (1  pra)[(   1)(1  pra)  ]A
+[(1  )(1  pra) + ]B
+(1  pra)[(   1)pra   qra]C
+pra(1  )D
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Figure 1. Average Fitness of Risk Averse Youngs
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Case 2.1.3.2.1: prs = qrs = 1;
WRS  W = 0:
Conclusion 3 If there exist only risk seeking youngs and risk seeking olds in a
population, then any representation of the mutant strategy among the olds will not
be observed.
Case 2.1.3.2.2: qrs 2 [0; 1] and prs = 1;
WRS  W = (1  qrs)F0 + (1  qrs)(   )qrsA+ (1  qrs)2(   )C > 0:
Conclusion 4 If there exist only risk seeking young agents in a population, then
the representation of the action RS in the old population grows. That is to say that
the representation of the mutant strategy among the olds arises.
Case 2.1.3.2.3: qrs 2 [0; 1] and prs = 0;
WRS  W = qrsF0 + (   )qrsA
 (   )(1  qrs)qrsB
+[(1   + ) + (   )(1  qrs)]C
+(1  qrs)[(   1  )  (   )(1  qrs)]D:
21
Figure 2. Average Fitness of Risk Seeking Olds
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CHAPTER 3
NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we perform the numerical analysis and comparative statics. We
examine how risk aversion will roll among the young agents for some sample values
of initial proportions of the risk averse youngs and risk averse olds for the game
which is played between youngs and olds. Under heterogeneity, we present the
mutation behavior among the youngs as of raise and fall tendency and the nal
circumstance of the mutant invasion. Thus, we are able to obtain the necessary
proportion conditions of the agent groups playing the mutant strategy to observe
an increase in mutation, thus an invasion of the entire population. That is, we
analyze how the tness of risk aversion of young people position itself in di¤erent
heterogeneous agent groups.
Without loss of generality in this section we will make our analsis for some
reasonable sample values for the payo¤s of each game such that A = 5, B = 4,
C = 0, and D = 2. These payo¤s are consistent with our assumption that each
game has one payo¤ dominant equilibrium and one risk dominant equilibrium.
Moreover, we also make our analysis for di¤erent initial tness levels, F0, which
work as initial endowment for the agents in the economy. Hence, the results we found
by encoding di¤erent levels of F0 into the model will be an important indicator of
analyzing the mutation behavior.
Table 5. The values of the di¤erence between the average tness of the risk
aversion of young population and the average tness of the entire population for
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di¤erent proportion levels of risk averse youngs and risk averse olds when F0 =
1; 5; 10; 50; 0; 1; 3; 4 respectively ( = 0:5)
pra qra WRA  W WRA  W WRA  W WRA  W
0:00 0:00  1:000  1:000  1:000  1:000
0:05 0:05  0:301 0:078 0:553 4:353
0:10 0:10  0:297 1:017 1:917 9:117
0:15 0:15 0:801 1:821 3:096 13:30
0:20 0:20 1:216 2:496 4:096 16:90
0:25 0:25 1:547 3:047 4:922 19:92
0:30 0:30 1:799 3:479 5:579 22:38
0:35 0:35 1:978 3:798 6:073 24:27
0:40 0:40 2:088 4:008 6:408 25:61
0:45 0:45 2:135 4:115 6:590 26:39
0:50 0:50 2:125 4:125 6:625 26:63
0:55 0:55 2:062 4:042 6:517 26:32
0:60 0:60 1:952 3:872 6:272 25:47
0:65 0:65 1:800 3:620 5:895 24:09
0:70 0:70 1:611 3:291 5:391 22:19
0:75 0:75 1:391 2:891 4:766 19:77
0:80 0:80 1:144 2:424 4:024 16:82
0:85 0:85 0:876 1:896 3:171 13:37
0:90 0:90 0:593 1:313 2:213 9:413
0:95 0:95 0:299 0:679 1:154 4:954
1:00 1:00 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
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pra qra WRA  W WRA  W WRA  W WRA  W
0:00 0:00  1:000  1:000  1:000  1:000
0:05 0:05  0:396  0:491  0:681  0:776
0:10 0:10 0:117 0:000  0:423  0:603
0:15 0:15 0:546 0:291  0:218  0:473
0:20 0:20 0:896 0:576  0:064  0:384
0:25 0:25 1:172 0:796 0:046  0:328
0:30 0:30 1:379 0:959 0:119  0:301
0:35 0:35 1:523 1:068 0:157  0:297
0:40 0:40 1:608 1:128 0:168  0:312
0:45 0:45 1:640 1:145 0:155  0:339
0:50 0:50 1:625 1:125 0:125  0:375
0:55 0:55 1:567 1:072 0:082  0:412
0:60 0:60 1:472 0:992 0:032  0:448
0:65 0:65 1:345 0:889  0:020  0:475
0:70 0:70 1:191 0:771  0:069  0:489
0:75 0:75 1:016 0:640  0:109  0:484
0:80 0:80 0:824 0:504  0:136  0:456
0:85 0:85 0:621 0:366  0:143  0:398
0:90 0:90 0:413 0:233  0:127  0:307
0:95 0:95 0:204 0:109  0:080  0:175
1:00 1:00 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
We conclude that for lower levels of the initial tness, the probability of observing
mutation will be higher. That is to say that, if F0 increases, then the risk aversion
among the young agents decreases.
Now, we consider how risk aversion evolves among the youngs for a given pop-
ulation if the population of olds is only constituted by risk seeking ones. Hence,
the young agents will match only with risk seeking olds. Similarly, we present the
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results of the condition if there exist only risk averse olds in the population. Thus,
the young agents now will only match with risk averse olds.
Table 6. The values of the di¤erence between the average tness of the risk
aversion of young population and the average tness of the entire population for
di¤erent proportion levels of risk averse youngs and only risk seeking olds, qra = 0
or only risk averse olds, qra = 1
pra WRA  W when qra = 0 WRA  W when qra = 1
0:00  1:000 4:000
0:05  0:631 3:753
0:10  0:275 3:510
0:15 0:068 3:273
0:20 0:400 3:040
0:25 0:718 2:813
0:30 1:025 2:590
0:35 1:319 2:372
0:40 1:600 2:160
0:45 1:869 1:952
0:50 2:125 1:750
0:55 0:000 1:553
0:60 2:600 1:360
0:65 2:819 1:173
0:70 3:025 0:990
0:75 3:219 0:812
0:80 3:400 0:640
0:85 3:569 0:472
0:90 3:725 0:310
0:95 3:869 0:152
1:00 4:000 0:000
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The e¤ect of changes in the structure of the matching process shows that if there
exist only risk averse olds in a population, then risk aversion exactly arises among
the youngs. Similarly, if there exist only risk seeking olds in a population, then the
evolution of risk aversion among the youngs depends on the level of the proportion of
risk averse youngs; the level of playing the mutant strategy would increase, decrease
or stay the same.
Now, we can consider the e¤ects of the mutation on the population structure by
means of the agentsintertemporal strategy choices. For this purpose, rst suppose
that the age groups choose their actions which lead them to the payo¤ dominant
equilibrium as in economics literature argument. Hence, let the population be con-
stituted by risk seeking youngs and risk averse olds at time t = 0: Let prs = 0:90
and qra = 0:90: Then, we expect a rise in number of the risk averse youngs and
risk seeking olds at t = 1. Let take these new higher proportions as pra = 0; 90
and qra = 0:10 at t = 1. Then, we observe the reverse at t = 2, i.e., risk aversion
decreases among the youngs. This means that, for this given game, under given
initial mutant proportions below, risk dominancy uctuates.
Table 7. Intertemporal analysis of risk dominant strategy frequency and payo¤
dominant strategy frequency permanence for di¤erent scenarios (n 2 Z+)
t pra prs qra qrs WRAyoung  W WRSold  W
0 0:10 0:90 0:90 0:10 3:325 2:825
1 0:90 0:10 0:10 0:90 3:325 2:825
2 0:95 0:05 0:05 0:95 3:644 3:144
n 0:975 0:025 0:025 0:975 3:817 3:317
n+ 1 1:00 0:00 0:00 1:00 4:000 3:500
t pra prs qra qrs WRAyoung  W WRSold  W
0 0:10 0:90 0:90 0:10 3:325 2:825
1 0:125 0:875 0:0125 0:9875  0:032 0:761
2 0:10 0:90 0:01 0:99  0:201 0:630
n 0:00 1:00 0:00 1:00  1:00 0:00
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t pra prs qra qrs WRAyoung  W WRSold  W
0 0:05 0:95 0:05 0:95  0:301 0:548
1 0:03 0:97 0:01 0:99  0:707 0:232
2 0:01 0:99 0:005 0:995  0:888 0:088
n 0:00 1:00 0:00 1:00  1:00 0:00
Hence, if we analyze a population when it is in its general risk taking behavior
pattern such that one group leaves playing risk dominant strategy and the other
group continues on choosing its risk dominant action, then we conclude that at the
end mutation become extinct for the payo¤ dominant equilibrium biased group.
Thus, this enable us to obtain the threshold levels of population proportions to
observe a risk dominancy continuousness in the subject population and vice versa.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this study, we have applied evolutionary game theory techniques to solve
a 2x2 coordination game which has one payo¤ dominant and one risk dominant
equilibrium in a model including youngs and olds populations to analyze their risk
taking behaviors. We have rst solved a benchmark model by taking the population
homogeneous in terms of age. Hence, we made the calculations for the games which
are played between only young agents and between only old agents. Then, we
derived the necessary conditions depending on the introduced payo¤ levels for risk
dominant strategy invasion for both youngs and olds populations.
In the second step, we have introduced heterogeneity into the benchmark model.
We stated the possibilities of matching between di¤erent age groups in this setup
and reached the equations that promote evolution in terms of risk taking behavior
of agents. Then, we derived the open form analytical levels of the payo¤s which
guarantee that for a given population, members would focus on choosing the risk
dominant action. We also provided numerically the e¤ects of the initial tness
level, initial risk averse and risk seeking proportions on the pattern of the evolution
process. We nd that decrease in initial level of tness increases the mutation.
Moreover, we concluded that in a population the olds of which are only risk averse,
mutation increases in time among the youngs. However, in a population the olds
of which are only risk seeking, there exists an initial risk aversion threshold for the
youngs population to promote risk aversion among them.
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Finally, we studied the intertemporal e¤ects of di¤erent risk averse and risk
seeking population proportions on mutation. We showed that it is possible to nd a
spesic initial mutation proportion which guarantees the further mutation continu-
ousness or uctuations on mutation. Moreover, in a population if one group leaves
playing risk dominant strategy and the other group continues on choosing its risk
dominant action, then we concluded that mutation become extinct for the payo¤
dominant equilibrium biased group.
Further extensions could be considered by applying di¤erent matching processes
which allow risk taking attitude switches. In this case, the possibility for matching
of players could be taken di¤erent for di¤erent population groups such that some
features like distance, neighborhood or social status would play a deterministic role
on the possibilities. This is appropriate to describe situations where players interact
only with some spesic players. Also, exogeneous variables that promote strategy
deviations could be included covering framing e¤ect and sunk cost fallacy which
would have e¤ect on the di¤erence between the payo¤ levels since people evaluate
these payo¤s with respect to their own lose understanding. Another important
question is how even small changes in Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion
(RRA) do a¤ect the decision process of agents. By using a three-period OLG Model
in which agents are heterogeneous with respect to their ages, as well as their risk
attitudes, we would work with not constant inter-temporal elasticity of substitution
as usual. RRA would vary across the agents such as (t); (t+1); (t+2) where (:)
is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (the inverse of relative risk aversion
measure). Hence, with respect to this link between time and risk aversion measure,
the intertemporal mutation behavior of a population would be studied in detail and
would be included in OLG framework endogeneously. Moreover, age distribution
could be detailed by adding more age intervals to the analysis. Finally, by increasing
the number of agents, the interactions among agents could be analyzed.
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